Building Culture by Møystad, Ole
N O R D I S K A R K I T E K T U R F O R S K N I N G 1 9 9 6 : 2 
Building Culture 
by Ole M0ystad 
T H E PHILOSOPHERTrond BergEriksen once held that a contem-porary theory of the Opus would have to comprise the entire process from the artists conception of the Opus to the obser-
vers use o f i t . 1 So doing he implied a l ink between behaviour and 
physics, thought and act, being and doing. 
W i t h i n the general field of architecture the extension of O p A is 
described by the amount of space-time it actualises. Its extension is 
hence spatial as well as temporal. I w i l l here specify its three para-
meters. 
Space 
Whereas Berg Eriksen was speaking o f basically any k ind of Opus, I 
wi l l confine my interest here to the one o f architecture. The reason 
for this is that architecture belongs to a k ind of activities that can be 
said to be rather basic to man. As a matter o f fact most of these 
activities we have have in common w i t h most animals. We must all 
eat, copulate, communicate and seek shelter in order to survive as 
species. What however gives man a certain superiority in the 
zoological pyramid, at least in his own eyes, is that which we can 
observe as a surplus o f form with in these kinds o f activities. 
We do not only eat in order to satisfy our need for nutr it ion. We 
do not copulate only in order to breed. O n the contrary; we often 
go through all sorts o f intricate procedures in order to copulate 
without causing reproduction, and i t has passed a long time since 
our grunts and cries became poetry and prose w i t h the ends not 
merely restricted to rut or warning. The same can be said o f 
protection, even i f Norberg-Schulz may be right in claiming that 
being an architect is the world's oldest profession only second to 
one. 2 Our architecture serves more diverse functions than our 
caves, paths and landmarks did. 
Tema 
SEMIOTIK 
This article will suggest an 
ontological stratification of 
architecture in the Opus of 
Architecture (OpA), the Object 
of Architecture (ObA), and 
the general Field of Architec-
ture (FoA). It will describe the 
three levels, and interrelate 
them according to the struc-
ture of a Peircean sign rela-
tion. 
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Figure 1. Louise Nevelson 
(b. 1899) assembles metal 
or wood fragments that in-
terest her - volumes and 
curves that make for 
marvelously subtle rhyth-
mic harmonies - and orga-
nizes them into totally con-
trolled architectonic sha-
pes. Moon Garden Wall II, 
1975. The Pace Gallery, 
New York. 
I consider this surplus of form to be of a 
nature somehow equivalent to the surplus 
that could be observed during the Baroque 
as various excesses. What is added is a sign 
aspect, by which the basic phenomenon, 
food — sex — shout/gesture — shelter, is tur-
ned into a basic resource of cognition. I t is 
turned into "... a k ind o f tool directly related 
to the mind, and fabricated out of its own 
special etheralised' resources: signs and 
symbols" 3 by which, says Lewis Mumford, 
the objects are brought into relationship 
w i t h the brain. 
The Opus o f Architecture is hence ser-
ving a more basic function than for instance 
the opus o f a Musician, a Sculptor - or an 
Engineer, and its meaning rests on an 
accordingly basic ground. Consequently 
every O p A extends from the most intimate, 
private touch to the public scene. By con-
stitution i t belongs to the sphere o f elemen-
tary pragmatics and collective horizon alike, as opposed to an opus o f 
the Fine Arts which may rest forever in the privacy of its creator — 
or his client 4, and still be a work of art. The Opus of the Engineer, 
which is essentially an assembly line product - let us say an 
engine, can however hardly be conceived as pertaining to anything 
else than our collective toolbox; we all have an engine. 
Time 
A purely aesthetic opus, a work of art, is conceived in the con-
sciousness o f an artist, hence in the present.5 Before the conception 
of the Sunflowers in the mind of Van Gogh, there was no trace of 
i t , there was nothing in the sunflower fields in Provence to indicate 
the future coming into being of this masterpiece. Posterior to its 
creation it however seems to go on for ever capturing the thoughts 
and feelings o f whoever is exposed to i t . 
The invention of, let us say, the steam engine is, however, rather 
easily retraceable. I n retrospect we can observe that prior to its of-
ficial invention by James Watt in 1769, a chain o f discoveries and 
inventions were done, starting wi th Papin in 1690 and Newcomen 
in 1705, to which the first application of the steam engine by Watt 
i n "The Albion M i l l " in 1785 was a more or less a logical conse-
quence. I t did astonished its contemporaries, but once they had 
understood the principles o f i t , the spell was broken. From there 
on the interest was turned to ways o f exploiting and improving its 
performative capacity. 
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Figure 2. Watt engine depic-
ted in an 1826 illustration. 
The engine transformed the 
vertical action of the piston 
rod (n) into rotary motion 
through the flywheel (Q). 
From John Farey, Treatise 
on the Steam Engine, 1827. 
Science Museum, London. 
I am deliberately simplifying things. Contemporary philosophy 
of science is questioning this way o f perceiving scientific discovery 
as a logical chain where one l ink follows the other, where every 
discovery comes as a necessary consequence of a prior chain o f 
discoveries. Prigogine illustrates this by the classical dictum that 
without Bach we would not have had the 'Matheus Passion', 
whereas 'The Theory of Relativity' would have been discovered 
quite irrespective o f Einstein or somebody else doing i t . Prigogine 
supports his doubts about the truth value of the dictum referring 
to significant facts that were ignored for long periods of time 
"... because the cultural climate was not yet mature for taking them 
up in a consistent schema".6 I t wi l l lead us far beyond the scope o f 
this study to go into a profound discussion of this problem, but 
Prigogine indicates the evolutionary pattern of science to be of a 
nature equivalent to a morphogenetic field. Whereas the dictum 
concerning Bach and the relativity presupposes an absolute finality 
of science, Prigogine proposes to renounce the absoluteness and to 
turn towards a conditionality as suggested by Rene Thorn, which is 
nevertheless a finality. 
This problem is important to keep in mind, but it concerns the 
principles of science, its global aspects, and not necessarily its local 
ones. I think Prigogine would agree that the invention of the steam 
engine was made, may be not necessary, but certainly probable by 
prior inventions, and that the same can not be said to be true about 
Van Gogh's Sunflowers. This does not change the fact that the power 
of the steam in a boiling kettle had been known for ages before 
'the cultural climate' was ready to exploit that energy technologically. 
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Figure 3. Bernard Tschumi's 
design strategy for Parc de 
la Villette is based on archi-
tecture as a space-time phe-
nomenon. His superposi-
tions of space, structure 
and succession of events 
give a clear example of an 
architecture conceived as 
Opus, rather than as object. 
The engineers making the preparatory inventions were not 
consciously preparing for the invention of the steam engine. The 
bringing into being o f the opus of engineering hence commences 
somewhere in its past, and is fulfilled in present. The aesthetic opus 
on the other hand, is brought into being in present and goes on 
unfolding into somewhere in future. 
The Architectonic Opus is initiated by a malfunction or some 
other discontinuity, Alexander calls it a misfit 7 , i n the architecto-
nic field. The 'misfit' can be somebody in need of a dwelling — or a 
hospital — or a city hall, i t can be an individual spéculant or a 
community w i t h a vacant lot wanting i t developed, or an engine 
factory in need of an extension etc. It can be any o f these things and 
an infinity of others that causes somebody to take on the role o f 
client, find an architect and ask h i m to do something about i t . The 
O p A hence extends towards its past, like the engine. Inasmuch as 
the architect conceives his opus w i t h respect to a future use which 
wi l l be unfolded far beyond the scope of his consciousness, the 
opus wi l l go on, like the sunflowers, to fill its users wi th wonder — 
for good as for bad — t i l l somewhere in the future. 
The O p A does in other words extend from somewhere in its past 
to somewhere in its future. Neither its beginning nor its end is fi-
nal. They are however both regulated by the 'present'. Inasmuch as 
this opus is an effect o f a prior cause, a discontinuity or misfit in 
the FoA, which i t in its turn regulates, we may say that we are in 
touch w i t h a final cause {une cause finale) in the sense that René 
Thorn gave to the concept.8 
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Actualization 
A t this point I wi l l concentrate on the 'present' o f the Opus, where 
its 'ethereal'9 substance is materialised. This is the mise-en-ceuvre, 
the act of making actual that which up to this point was virtual, and 
o f thereby initiating new virtuality. 
The conceptual entity, whose form has been generated in the course 
of its past by that part of the architectonic field which it has traversed, 
is now given material being. It hence becomes part of the same field 
of architecture in general. This means that the conceptual entity 
reflecting the initial discontinuity, is first given the form of a commis-
sion by the client/user 10. The client/user then commissions the 
architect to solve the problem. The solution that the architect produces 
is to restructure the architectonic field in such a way as to re-establish its 
continuity on the point in question. The solution is usually, but not 
necessarily, represented by an Object of Architecture. 
The conceptual entity hence passes from receiver of form to 
giver; from concept-being-generated to being-generator-of-con-
cept. Please observe that only ' i t ' , the substrate carrying the concep-
tualisation, changes ontological status; O b A comes into £«'ragand 
gives O p A a material ontology. The concept, or OpA, is however 
becoming all the way — i t remains dynamic. 
W i t h respect to architecture as a basic way of human behaviour and 
cognition, one aspect of the Opus is particularly important to keep in 
mind. According to the experiencialist theory of Cognitive Seman-
tics 1 1 , thought, also conceptualisation as outlined here above, is orga-
nised and stored in conceptual categories (as opposed to arbitrary sym-
bols like words). Such categories are defined by schemas basically gene-
rated by our bodily and mental interaction with our environments. 
Piaget taught us that. Recent cognitive studies confirm it, and develop 
its epistemological implications in schemas called Kinaesthetic Image-
Schemas. They rest on a reciprocal mind-body-world logic basically 
equivalent to the one of the Force Dynamic Theory. 1 2 The hence esta-
blished table of categories is furthermore stratified. The stratification is 
organised around a level which is cognitively (but not necessarily 
philosophically!) basic, wherefrom super- and subordinate levels are 
derived. In terms of architecture the individual Opus, for instance 
NN's residence, would be the basic level of categorisation. The next 
level super ordinate to the basic level category would be residential ar-
chitecture and then architecture in general. The subordinate level 
would be the particular wooden, or concrete, structure to be found at 
NN's address, then for instance the wall, the floor, the... etc. 
super ordinate: vehicles foresturban structure FoA 
basic: car treeskyscraper OpA 
subordinate: Citroen DS oak treeLever House ObA 
Figure 4. Schema of categories and their stratification. 
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The properties making a basic level cognitively basic can be 
summarized in four respects: 
i) Perception; the members o f a basic level category have an easily 
overall perceived shape. A residence is easily identifiable, and re 
presentable, in one mental image, which can also represent the 
entire category o f Architecture. The same is not true for archi-
tecture in general or for a wooden structure. 
ii) Function; it is at the basic level that most cultural functions of a 
category member is determined. I t is difficult to speak o f the cul-
tural function of architecture in general without reference to 
individual buildings, or of the curtain wall without reference to 
a sky scraper. We have general motor programs for interaction 
w i t h buildings and sky scrapers. The same is not true for archi-
tecture in general - or for Lever House in particular; architect or 
user alike. 
iii) Communication; at the basic level we find the most commonly 
used and contextually neutral words designating the category 
members, first to enter lexica and first learned by children. 
Children start drawing houses long before they care about 
environmental design or construction, most persons never go 
beyond the basic level o f architecture at all in this respect. This is 
true also for quite a few architects. 
iv) Knowledge Organisation; most of our knowledge about the 
category is stored at its basic level. Most people know a lot more 
about houses than about architecture or construction. 
O p A is in other words our access gate to Architectural Knowledge. 
However; without super ordinate category levels of higher abstrac-
tion as cognitive syntax {architecture) and subordinate category 
levels of concrete matter as let us say cognitive syntagms {archi-
tectonic objects) there is not much knowledge obtainable, maybe 
only the shrill o f a phenomenological, but unintelligible expe-
rience. 
The Object of Architecture 
I w i l l also remind my reader o f the difference between architectural 
and architectonic. The first predicate refers strictly to a physically 
built object or entity, the second has a wider definition. I t has a 
more abstract meaning referring strictly to the structural property 
o f something. A political proposition can be architectonic, but not 
architectural. A building can be both. 
When I use 'Object o f Architecture' in the context of this text, I 
refer to a physical objectivity, but not necessarily to one homo-
genous object, like a house, a perimeter block, or a square. The rea-
son for using 'Object of Architecture' is to have the category com-
prise points o f conjuncture. The meeting point between a local ur-
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ban structure and the European railroad network (the TGV) in 
Lille can hence be considered an 'Object of Architecture' 1 3 . A n 
example on a smaller scale would be the street corner which is a 
point of conjuncture between let us say one local artery one main 
street, and at least one building. 
Conjunctures are far too rarely defined as objects in their own 
right and given as a commission to an architect. This is however ne-
cessary; how can we expect continuity i f points of conjunction are 
only points where one object randomly juxtaposes wi th another, or 
where an object simply ends? At their worst such points are referred 
to as 'Space-Left-Over-After-Planning' (SLOAP). Then it is no point 
of conjunction, but void or conflict. 
Nota bene; continuity is something very different from 'holism'. 
Continuity is something which is created locally and piecemeal. 1 4 
Holism is imposed globally by reducing Architecture in general to 
one Object of Architecture. 
Figure 5. The abandoned 
bunker at Vigso in Den-
mark, once part of Nazi 
Germany's Atlantic Wall, 
now deprived of the context 
that once generated it, 
presents itself as naked 
object - as Heideggerian 
Ding. 
Use 
I w i l l adopt the proposal of Norberg-Schulz to abolish the 
distinction between 'function' and 'symbolic value' as irrelevant. 1 5 
I n their place I wi l l put use. Use hence contains some basic pro-
perties of man's relation to his architectural environment, by which 
i t constitutes man as user, and it constitutes the context in which 
the user experiences the discontinuity which initiates the OpA. Use 
is furthermore subjectively constituted. This means that it is based 





Figure 6. Chorematics of Construction. Figure 7. Chorematics of Architecture. 
in the subject, but not that all use is subjective. As we can read from 
the chorematic in fig. 6, it extends far beyond the realm of the 
subject which hardly exceeds Chora. I t is hence exposed to a strong 
objective influence and regulation. 
Use is consequently the context w i t h i n which the continuity 
must be re-established. 
Material 
I mean literally stone, wood and all the other objective substances 
from which we build our environments. I w i l l use a Chorematic 
Schema to elaborate on the position o f the material. 
A Chorals Greek and means "space/site/place which is occupied 
by something or somebody" 1 6; in other words a place considered in 
relation to a subject, by which the subject can be inside or outside a 
condition, a position, a room, a community, a meaning, an opi-
nion, a territory - or whatever constitutes the chora. When a sub-
ject hence is defined in relation to a chora, we have a choreme. W i t h 
such choremes we can construct a chorematic by which it is 
possible to analyse more complex subject — object relations. 
Chorematics are in other words a transcultural proxemic schema 1 7. 
A t this point I have constructed the Chorematics of construction 
based on the continuum of thought according to Per Aage 
Brandt 1 8 . As basic chora I have used the human body, and wi th in 
'Chora' (cf. 'choreography') 'Eidos' is located. 
Eidos however is a difficult entity wi th in a chorematic, because 
the subject can only be inside it . To go outside it , the subject must die 
and become object. The only object, to my knowledge, to which it 
is possible to become subject is the human embryo. Death and 
birth may be semiotically significant entities, but ontology con-
centrates on that which is being, on life so to speak. For the present 
ends I have therefore not given Eidos any extension, but 
represented it as the point forming the centre o f the chorematic. 
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Figure 8. Jongleurs en ville, 
1929/50, 25,5x24,5 cm. 
Paul Klee. The virtual archi-
tecture of FoA. 
Materials arise in Physis, and following our chorematic schema 
of construction, figure 6, they move towards Eidos. When they 
reach Polis, they enter the sphere o f subjective influence. They 
enter into use where they are used for purposes that originate closer 
to Eidos and move in the opposite direction. 
Material contains some basic properties of nature's relation to 
man's architectural environment. When Louis Kahn asked the stone 
what it wanted to be, he was at the outskirts of town, in the tran-
sitional zone between Polis and Physis. Inasmuch as the stone an-
swered 'Give me the Arch it must already have been under some 
influence o f Use. A stone in the middle of physis would probably 
have answered ' I am what I am, what is wantV. 
When a material becomes a building material, i t demonstrates 
the static preconditions that nature sets for construction. 
Construction 
The static preconditions of a building material regulate the relation 
between the material and what happens to be its possible respec-
tively necessary form. Use modifies and discursivates the same pre-
conditions. Construction is hence the form of the tension which is 
generated between use and material. Understood like this it abo-
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lishes the distinction between an 'ethereal' entity as use and a phy-
sical one like material. 
When construction submits to the preconditions given by the 
material, the tension goes towards zero, and less form is generated. 
Tension rises when use modifies and discursivates the precon-
ditions, and more form is generated. 
A condition o f no tension at all and hence no form can only be 
imagined outside Physis. Even nature has form and construction, 
which of course rises the question of subjectivity, intention and 
ultimately of intelligence - in nature. I w i l l however avoid that 
discussion by leaving the question open and concentrating on FoA. 
I n order to outline our field o f interest and relate i t to an inside and 
an outside, I w i l l again refer to the chorematic schema. 
The Field of Architecture 
Chance is first, Law is second, the tendency to take habits is Third. 
Mind is first, Matter is second, Evolution is third. 
Such are the materials out of which chiefly a philosophical theory 
ought to be built, in order to represent the state of knowledge to 
which the nineteenth century has brought us. 19 
I would not say the twentieth century has made it necessary to use 
other materials, but I do think it has made it necessary to admit 
that we still do not know very well how to use the ones we have. 
Cognition studies like Force Dynamics as well as Catastrophe 
Theory and Cognitive Semantics use metaphors, or image sche-
mas, from the world o f material ontology and from our inter-
actions w i t h i t , in order to represent matters of semiotic nature. 
Chorematics is one such schema, and architecture is the structure 
o f the central chorematic zone in which the most part o f these 
metaphors are produced. This indicates that such schemas are 
epistemological metaphors only when applied outside architecture. 
W i t h i n architecture they should probably be considered propre 
epistems. 
Apprehended like this, Architecture' - FoA - emerges as some-
thing of a basic level category of Existence. I am now reasoning close 
to Heidegger; it is however essential to keep in mind that i f there is 
a Cause Finale, i t rests in O p A - not in FoA. That is also the level on 
which the interaction schemas are generated; we do not interact 
w i t h architecture as such - do we ? W i t h i n a cognitive context FoA 
is therefore a, or the super ordinate category of the OpA, to which 
the equivalent of Heidegger's Ding- the ObA - is subordinate. 
When we superimpose the chorematics of Construction, figure 
6, on the chorematics of Architecture, figure 7, the location of the 
O b A is indicated by the overlap of'Construction' and FoA. Even i f 
characterising as 'basic level category of Existence' is no fallacy, it 
would be more precise to refer to i t as the 'Construction' of culture. 
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Ideas 
I think we may safely say that the studies preliminary to the 
construction of a great theory should be at least as deliberate and 
thorough as those that are preliminary ro the building of a 
dwelling house.20 
This dictum of Peirce's rests upon what he refers to as "philo-
sophical architectonics" 2 1, and of which the quotation introducing 
the present paragraph is a basic principle. 
Ideas pertain to mind; to Eidos in the chorematics. When Peirce 
speaks of 'First, Second and Thi rd ' , he refers to three modes o f 
being. I n "The Principles o f Phenomenology" 2 2 he calls these three 
modes, called 'Firstness, Secondness andThirdness'. I w i l l outline 
the first mode immediately. The second and the third wi l l be 
outlined below. 
Firstness is the being o f qualitative possibility, or what I have 
referred to as virtuality. I n Peircean architectonics ideas wi l l hence 
belong to the category of "Firstness", and so wi l l knowledge as a 
possibility, a promise, or a quality o f the Knowledge-Object 2 3. 
Quality has no temporal or spatial extension, neither have ideas, 
knowledge, intention or Use as such. They may be considered as 
qualities in this sense; qualities of FoA. 
I suggest to apprehend that which is experienced as an urge to 
cultivation, civilisation, education, form, as an urge to think, to 
plan, to create order, the welfare state, the Utopia of the classless 
Marxist society, I suggest to apprehend these sometimes irresistible 
urges as effects o f such qualities o f FoA. Such quality is, I believe, 
Architecture' 's first mode of being. 
The effects of the urges, however, or the urges when they have 
effects, belong to its second mode of being. 
Matter 
Secondness is the being of actual fact. Entities pertaining to this, 
second, mode of being tend to resist our w i l l , to react upon i t . A 
mere quality has no form, no effect, and does not react or resist. 
When a quality, like the urge outlined under 'Ideas', has effect, it is 
not virtual, but actual. This means that it has come into actual 
being and become matter. The matter o f Architecture' is not 
necessarily physical. 'Matter' is an ontological property signifying 
that something has a stable and actual being; that it is a fact. We can 
now see the difference between the 'Matter' o f Architecture' and 
the 'Material' o f the Architectonic Object'. 
'Matter' hence signifies the impact of that which is actually 
being, and I wi l l situate it chorematically in Physis. I am aware that 
many facts are encountered in Polis, Oikos, and even in Chora; 
many facts have come into being only there. Their stability 
however, their very capability of reaction to wi l l , or Use, rests upon 
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the preconditions given by Physis. N o t one Utopia, to my know-
ledge, has become a fact. 
When even the Scandinavian Welfare State hardly seems to sur-
vive the generation who conceived i t , i t is due to facts whose oppo-
sition to first rate social democratic ideas is so strong that it is now 
changing the form of the Scandinavian Societies. To put it bluntly; 
the idea is social and material safety and equality for all members of 
the community. This is a quality - a possibility. The matter o f fact 
in the case of a society seems to be rather more related to the 
principles of survival and group formation as we know it from na-
ture in general; among animals and in biological organisms. 
The same kind of matter oîfact is at play in 'Architecture'. What 
happened at Pruitt-Igoe in 1972 (fig. 5 show the blowing up of the 
blocks) was an abrupt change of Architecture's form due to facts o f 
Architecture' rather strongly opposing modern ideas o f Architec-
ture'. Such facts are Architecture's second mode o f being. 
Morphogenesis 
Form is that which is generated in the field of tension, of dynamic, 
between idea and matter. Culture is such form, and civilisation. 
Culture and civilisation evolve wi th a certain habitual regularity, 
and so does Architecture'. 
A t first one can be lead to look for the laws o f this evolution, but 
".. .when we see both sides o f the shield we call (them) thoughts." 2 4 
This evolution process is not quality. Quality does not change or 
grow, and quality has no reason. There is no reason why red is red, it 
quite simply is red without any reason. Thoughts have reasons, but 
they are not facts. Facts are actually existing and they are part i-
cular. Thoughts are general and can be referring to non existent 
things like unicorns just as well as to existing ones like horses. We 
are therefore having to do w i t h a mode of being of Architecture' 
which is neither quality nor fact. I w i l l call thought in this context 
the habit o f generating form, and refer to this as Architecture' 's 
third mode of being. I t is according to this mode of being that it is 
doing the labour of constructing culture. 
Pour conclure 
i) Architecture as a general concept, FoA, wi l l then constitute the 
syntax by which the Opus and the Object can be understood. I t is 
that cognitive structure or function which enables us to connect 
the two and hence render them intelligible. I w i l l therefore give Ar-
chitecture the position o f the Interprétant. 
ii) The Opus, OpA, is that level o f architecture to which the use 
as well as the design o f architecture refers. I t is the level in which our 
experience o f architecture is founded, and on which our inter-
relation wi th it is at its most intense and extensive. This corre-
sponds to what Peirce calls the idea behind - or "the ground' o f the 
sign or representamen.2 5 The position is usually referred to as the 
Representamen, and that is the position I w i l l give to the O p A 2 6 . 
i i i) The object, IOI, is that particular entity for which the sign -
in some repects relative to the ground- stands. I t is furthermore the 
object which actually induces the experience of which the ground is 
ground. I t stands behind the IRJ which represents i t . The object 
position wi l l hence be the position of the Object of Architecture, 
ObA. 
This is a rough schematization which in no way is sufficiently 
precise or elaborate, but i t w i l l suffice as a point o f departure. Its 
graphic representation is shown in figure 9. 
I FoA 
R O OpA ObA 
Figure 9. 
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15. Norberg-Schulz in lecture at The Norwegian Polytechnical 
School inTrondheim 17/111990. 
16. Brandt 1983, p. 242 ff. For the presise translation o f the Greek 
term Brandt is referring to C. Berg: Grxsk-Dansk Ordbog, 
Kobenhavn 1963. 
17. Cf. Umberto Eco's discussion of the proxemics and semiotics o f 
EdwardT. Hal l (Hall 1966) and Claude Levy Strauss in "Func-
tion and Sign: The semiotica of Architecture" in Broadbent, 
Bunt & Jencks eds. 1980. 
18. Cf. Brandt in Moystad 1992, p. 112 (NA No 2,1992). 
19. Ch. S. Peirce i n "The Architecture ofTheories", Buchler 1955, 
p. 323. 
20. Peirce in Buchler 1955, p. 316. 
21. Peirce i n Buchler 1955, p. 323. M i k h a i l Bakhtin (1895-1975) was 
another great, all too late known outside Russia, neo-Kantian 
philosopher and thinker of Architectonics. Cf. Holquist 1990 
and Bakhtin 1991. 
22. I n Buchler 1955, p. 74 ff. 
23. The concept of Knowledge-Object is elaborated in Moystad 
1991 (The Yearbook of the Oslo School of Architecture ippi-ipp2) 
24. Peirce in Buchler 1955, p. 78. 
25. In Buchler 1955, p. 99. 
26. According to convention o f Peircean literature this position in 
the sign relation is designated w i t h an /R/ for representamen. 
This position hence has a double role; it is a position wi th in the 
relation, the position of what can be understood as the pheno-
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